Pacific oil company Essay Example for Free

Pacific oil company Essay The Pacific Oil Company went into negotiations with Reliant Manufacturing, and its goal was to sign a more long-term agreement. Pacific assumed that the new contract would be signed with no major hurdles or objectives, and that the dominant point of negotiation would be price. Jean Fontaine, who is the marketing vice president for Pacific Oil, went into a negotiation process with Reliant. Jean started the process several years before Reliant Manufacturing’s contract was up, hoping to beat her competition to the lower price offers and leave with a contract extension of 5 years. Unfortunately, Jean did not properly research her client’s needs or adequately project what the outcome might be. Because of this, Pacific Oil Company was not prepared to address the concerns and requests that Reliant brought up during the negotiation. Though both parties wanted to move quickly toward signing a contract, Pacific Oil Company elongated this process because it did not have a thorough negotiation strategy that included a contingency plan or best alternatives. Pacific oil also neglected to draw out its best alternatives or bottom line in advance. Staying on the Same Page in Business Negotiations Pacific believed that other elements of the contract might be discussed, but that no dramatic changes would be expected. Because of Pacific’s lack of strategic planning, they wasted valuable time, money, emotional stress and energy. They also risked losing other opportunities that could have been more favorable for them. Adding to the problem was Pacific’s assumption that Reliant would sign a new contract quickly. Because of the time and money spent on traveling and negotiating back and forth, and the potential need for new technology development, which would be based on the contract’s outcome, Pacific Oil Company became increasingly desperate to finalize a contract with Reliant. As a result, Reliant obtained the advantage needed to make more demands during negotiations. Additionally, Reliant was aware of Pacific Oil’s dependence on its business, and took full advantage of these opportunities.

Effects of Manipulating Individual Identity

Effects of Manipulating Individual Identity Abstract: This study examined how changing the perception of social distance changed the way in which subjects interacted in the Trust Game specifically looking into the social preferences they displayed. A discussion of both economic and sociological research demonstrates the inherent variability of social identity and social distance and the interconnected nature these concepts have with social preferences. A two-stage experiment involving subjects of different nationalities and genders was carried out with a different identity focus in each stage. Findings show that subjects exhibit greater social preferences when interacting with those of a similar focused identity yet the degrees of these preferences displayed vary in accordance to the identity focus. Results suggest that social distance, although easily manipulated, is a powerful force in interactions. The results are consistent with previous studies into group membership, identity, nationality, gender and social preferences. Given this studys far-reaching implications it should be viewed as the premise for future study of this topic. Introduction The concept of social distance as elucidated by Akerlof (1997) is profoundly linked with social identity and social preferences. It is the differences in individuals social identities, including for example, race, gender, class and status, that determine the benefits of interaction and to what extent of social preferences are displayed. Yet when individuals are not entirely familiar with each other, the perception of social identities is based on very few observations and is therefore not entirely accurate. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether or not variations in the perception of social identity, and thus social distance, will affect the extent to which social preferences are manifested. Studies on the effect of identity are in no way new. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) studied its relevance and magnitude with regards to gender discrimination in the workplace, poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of labour. Akerlof (1997) also studied the effect of social distance, asserting that the social identity of individuals can substantially affect their interactions. What has not been tested, however, is to what extent identity is merely a perception. Individuals can and do possess multiple identities varying in dominance from situation to situation. The hypothesis of this paper is that social preferences are relevant in experimental games, but these are dependent on how each player perceives the others social identity, a perception that is inherently variable. Players react with varying degrees of self-interest according to the identity they perceive, even when identical character profiles are involved. Recent economic studies fail to sufficiently incorporate current sociological thinking as to the nature of social identity and although this study will give evidence for the relevance of social distance in determining degrees of social preferences, it will attempt to shed light on individuals inconsistent perception of the distance between them. In order to add weight to this position, an experiment was organised in which participants of various profiles were invited to play the Trust Game. Each game was played face-to-face with no verbal communication. The experiment was divided into two stages, a nationality focused stage and a gender focused stage. Each participant played the game twice and never with the same opposing player. Before each game, participants were assigned to certain rooms in which video clips were played depending on the identity focused on. In the first stage, participants were split into three rooms, one for each nationality present: Scottish, English and Chinese. After one play of the Trust Game, the experiment commenced its second stage and participants were split into two rooms, one for each gender, and again asked to play the game. The results show that there is significant variation in the degrees of social preferences displayed depending on the identity being focused on hereafter referred to as the focused identity. When nationality was the focused identity, those with this common identity exhibited greater social preferences than those of differing nationalities, regardless of gender. When gender was the focused identity, those with this common identity exhibited greater social preferences than those of differing gender, regardless, to some extent, of nationality. This lack of consistency shows that the perception of social distance is not a constant through both stages and yet it is still proves to be a determining factor in how players interact. The following content of this paper is arranged into four sections. Section 2 will address the relevant literature with regards to social preferences and identity, showing their relevance, interconnected nature and inherent variability, discussing the application of various theories in the context of this study. Section 3 will describe the design and implementation of the experiment used in this study with the results, analysis and comparisons to similar studies presented in Section 4. An interpretation of these results and further conclusions will be offered in Section 5. Theories of Preferences and Identity To clearly understand the argument presented, a holistic discussion of current theories must be embarked upon. The relevance of social preferences and the forms of their analysis through experimental games will be examined in this section to create the context in which this study is placed. The concepts of identity and how they shape perceptions and interactions will then be considered before discussing their relationship with social preferences. Social Preferences The assumption that man is motivated by self-interest is one that has dominated economic theory and is indeed fundamental to the very ideology of the vast majority of economists. As Adam Smith (1910:13) suggests, It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. Inherent in this analogy is the implication that self-interest is the primary motivator in our economic interactions, and it is through this impulse that equilibria are formed. In Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium is obtained by each player assuming the other possesses purely selfish motives. This assumption, however, is not always consistent with reality. Many factors influence an individuals decisions and it is evident that the maximisation of material gain is not always a dominating motivation. Some of the factors influencing an individuals decisions can relate to social status, group membership, inequity aversion, reciprocity, s pite, envy, altruism and identity. These factors form a preference set, referred to in this study as social preferences. Although the theory of self-interest has been ingrained in traditional economics, modern economists have increasingly questioned this supposition. In fact the traditional authors of this theory were also wary of its realism. Even though Edgeworth (1881:16) writes that the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest, he concedes that Man is, in reality, for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian, (Edgeworth 1881:104). It is evident that we are influenced by unselfish motives in our interactions with others and it follows that these interactions will in many circumstances involve material profit and loss. This is the realm of social preferences. Amartya Sen (1977:336), in his seminal paper on the irrationality of traditional preference theory states that the purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. He argues that theories that do not encompass the influence of sympathy and our commitment to it are incomplete. It is the result of this basic emotion that our social norms, laws and codes of conduct are formed and without which no society would be feasible (Johansen 1977). In various studies into social preferences, it is seen that they are comprised of multiple aspects. Reciprocity, inequity aversion, altruism and trust are all basic components of this preference set (Andreoni et al. 2002). When kindness or animosity is shown, the impulse exists to reciprocate in like manner. When inequity exists, the urge exists to rebel against it. Altruism is the virtue that depends on no form of expected gain or reciprocity, the purest form of good will. Trust is the confidence in the future actions of another and is arguably the most variable of the social preferences and one that will be revisited in this study. Each of these attributes are far from abstract philosophical concepts, exert great influence on our economic interactions. Agell and Lundberg (1995) discovered that as a result of workers being influenced by fairness and equity customs, wage cuts were often unprofitable, with workers objecting to an unfair action. This can have a direct impact on the extent that a company vertically integrates, with out-sourcing often being far more viable given the reciprocal attitude of workers. Bewley (1999) also noted that a firms policy can affect worker morale and as such companies must take into account the perceived fairness of their policies. The extent of tax evasion has also been correlated to how fair it is perceived, and in fact the entire structure of tax systems are thoroughly debated and altered according to the principles of equity and merit (Seidl and Traub 2002). The perception of unreciprocated generosity has been one of the causes of the general reduction in support from the US w elfare state. People are disinclined to support welfare structures that give the impression that they are helping a poor segment of society that refuse to help themselves, content to live off the goodwill of others (Bowles and Gintis 2000). Fukuyama (1995) also correlates economic prosperity with higher levels of trust, suggesting that social preferences are a very powerful force even in the current global economic system. Sequential games Although the examples given are wide-ranging in scope, involving relatively large economic issues, social preferences have also been proven to have a significant effect on individual interactions. Previously experimental games have been used to prove the dominating forces of self-interest, the equilibria of these experiments being calculated by assuming that all agents were exclusively self-interested (Fehr and Schmict, 2001). Recently, economists have carried out several experiments involving non-cooperative games that contradict this presumption. Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) were among the first to create a game that did just this. It is called the Ultimatum Game. There are two players in the game, one a Proposer and one a Responder. The Proposer must divide an amount of money X between the two players, offering the Responder any amount Y = X. If Responder accepts, the Proposer receives the remaining money X – Y, if they reject, both receive nothing. Under self-interested preferences, the efficient equilibrium is the one in which the Proposer gives the least amount possible to the Responder, who will accept any amount. In reality however, offers of less than a fifth of X are rejected about half time and Proposers anticipating this generally offer around 30 to 50 percent of X (Hoffman et al. 1996). This result clearly shows that factors other than self-interest are at play. It would be reasonable to assume that altruism and reciprocity both play a part in the decision-making process of both players. The Proposer may be influenced by a code of morals and a concept of fairness to offer more than the standard equilibrium distribution. The P roposer must also take into account the Responders sense of reciprocity and animosity towards a seemingly unfair distribution. Although the Responder is under no monetary incentive to reject a low offer, yet his social preferences mean that he is able to achieve some utility by spiting the Proposer, thereby valuing a certain amount of reciprocity over monetary value. Given the fact that the Proposers actions may be driven only by the fear of reciprocity and no sense of altruism, it is worthwhile to look into the Dictators Game first introduced by Kahneman et al. (1986) and refined by Forsythe et al. (1994). In this game, the Responder, now called the Recipient, is not given the option to accept or refuse the amount given by the Proposer. If the Proposer is motivated by self-interested alone, they will offer nothing to the Recipient but as many experiments have shown, this is not always the case. Henrich et al. (2001) find that in most dictator game experiments there is a primary mode offer of zero percent of the Proposers total wealth and a secondary mode offer of 50 percent. Some groups show a primary mode offer of 20 percent and a secondary mode of 50 percent providing strong evidence of inequity aversion. In addition to supporting the notion that man is not exclusively self-interested, studies also confirm that fear of reciprocity is present i n the Ultimatum Game and that Proposers apply backwards induction with average offers being lower in the Dictator Game (Roth et al. 1991). The Trust Game, developed by Berg et al. (1995) is a game that can be used to test the presence of altruism, inequity aversion, reciprocity and its namesake, trust. The game is played with an Investor and a Trustee, with the former being given an initial endowment of X and the latter given nothing. The Investor is then able to give any amount Y between 0 and X. The amount the Trustee receives will be tripled, amounting to 3Y. The Trustee is then given the option to give any amount Z between 0 and 3Y back to the Investor thereby making the payoffs of the Investor and the Trustee X – Y + Z and 3Y – Z respectively. The Trustee is under no monetary incentive to return any amount and as such, under strictly self-interested preferences the Investor will predict this and give the Trustee nothing but, as with the Ultimatum and Dictator Games, studies show that many players of the Trust Game deviate from this equilibrium. Berg et al. (1995) find that almost all Investors give so me amount of money to the Trustee and that a substantial number of Trustees return at least the same amount and that a third even returned more than they received. The amount returned also increases with the amount given thus supporting the theory that reciprocity is an integral part of many preference sets. Investors and Trustees are able to display inequity aversion by choosing to give or return amounts that will equalise final payoffs. Trustees can also display altruism by returning anything over and above the amount needed to equalise payoffs. It is interesting to note that there is substantial variation in the amounts given, with no clear average amount entrusted. The variation is not unsurprising, however, given the inherent inconsistency in levels of trust that individuals demonstrate in their interactions with various individuals. In society, trust placed in an individual is dependent on who that individual is or, in other terms, trust placed is dependent on the perceived id entity of the individual in question. Identity Identity, at its most fundamental level, is at the base of all human interaction. For an individual to interact with another, the individual must have a clear concept of both himself and of the other. It is in the consideration of these two concepts that decisions are made. Descartes (1912:167) famously stated †¦I think, therefore I am, and in doing so sparked off the philosophical debate on what truly directs our thoughts and actions. Hume (1888) further develops this by exploring our perception of ourselves, our identity. It was his belief that we can only perceive ourselves, and build our identity, by categorisation in the light of selected characteristics and never perceive our true reality in objective terms. It is out-with the bounds of this study to discuss in depth the sociological and psychological complexities of this topic, yet it is worth-while bringing to light some key concepts to further the understanding of the interactions between this studys participants. An identity is a tool of recognition. It allows us to recognise individuals, categories, groups and types of individuals, Wiley (1994:130). More than this, it is also a tool of categorisation and emotional cues. It implies a conscious awareness by members of a group, some positive or negative emotional feelings towards the characteristics which members of a group perceive themselves as sharing and in which they perceive themselves as differing from others, Mennell (1994:177). Goffman (1968) further expounds these aspects of recognition by dividing identity into three sections: the personal identity, the ego identity and the social identity. The personal identity is the unique identification that each individual possesses to differentiate themselves technically, legally and realistically from all others. The ego identity is a purely subjective observation that is built from a multitude of social experiences and is a sense of ones own particular state and nature. The social identity pr ovides a way of categorising people and connects each person with a set of attributes and characteristics thought to be in keeping with the members of their respective categories. Individuals that possess commonalities in the form of thought, action, nature, experience or lifestyle can all be grouped into various social identities. Examples of social identities are nationality, gender, music-taste, age, profession and political views. It is important to stress that while individuals may only hold one personal and ego identity, they are able to juggle multiple social identities which have varying degrees of focus from situation to situation. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) put forward the theorem that our perception of our ego identity can have a significant influence on our decisions and actions. Their theorem sheds light on a number of seemingly irrational choices. Actions that are of apparent detriment to an individual can be viewed as a form of behaviour that it used to create a more unique self identity. Similarly, steps may be taken to symbolise the assumption of a particular identity or the membership of a certain group, be they conscious or otherwise. Men do not generally wear dresses, and as such this behavioural code is unconsciously subscribed to by the majority of men. Any behaviour to the contrary poses a challenge not merely to the social norm, but to the identity of manhood itself. Attempts to manipulate an individuals decisions can be based on the notion of identity. In order to influence people to buy their products, companies create advertisements that often show a stylised form of a particular identity that people may aspire to. Finally, as identity can play such a large role in determining our economic decisions and behaviour, and assuming that individuals can choose their own identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) conclude that identity choices can be a major factor in a persons overall economic well-being, a conclusion strengthened by the theory of role-identities. It is difficult to determine to what extent our identity is prescriptive or descriptive in relation to our own actions, but nevertheless the dual concepts of identity and role are deeply interconnected. Lyman and Scott (1970:136) clarify this link by stating that roles are identities mobilised in a specific situation; whereas role is always situationally specific, identities are trans-situational. By assuming an identity, we also assume a role. Despite that the fact that this role varies from situation to situation, it is at all times consistent with the assumed identity. It is from this notion that expectations and metaperspectives are formed. Laing et al. (1966) pioneered the belief that it is not I but you that is important. More specifically they claimed that we are all deeply influenced by considering our view of others view of ourselves and in such a way develop a role-performance that conforms to the expectation others have of our behaviour so as to receive positive feedback o r avoid negative feedback. In order to assess these expectations and act accordingly, we must first judge what these expectations are. With strangers, this is problematic, and as such we orient ourselves toward them in terms only of the ill-specified contours of their social roles, (McCall and Simmons, 1978:70). In this respect, we are only able to form rough estimations of a persons true identity and thereby rely on our perception of how they fit into vague boundaries of social identities. When we perceive people this way, our perception of the attributes they possess as ascribed by their social identity is often completely arbitrary when viewed in the context of an objective character analysis. The perception and reality can at times be poles apart, decreasing in accuracy with increasing social distance. Identities and Social Preferences Akerlof (1997) defined social distance as a measure of social proximity between individuals. The model he created summarises that people gain benefits from interacting to those socially closer to themselves, with these benefits decreasing with isolation. This model is supported by empirical evidence that suggests that trust and reciprocity are linked with social connection and that members of the same nationality and race exhibit greater degrees of these attributes towards one another (Glaeser et al. 1999). A common method of analysing social distance is through the construction of groups in experiments and many studies of this kind have provided quite significant results. Studying the effects of group membership on cooperation, Orbell et al. (1988) find that subjects are far more likely to cooperate with in-group members than out-group members, with 79% of participants showing cooperation with the former and only 30% showing cooperation with the latter. Through using a variation on the dictator game, Frey and Bohnet (1997) also showed how group membership affects social preferences. The experiment observed that in-group members were allocated far more of the total endowment than out-group members suggesting some correlation with membership and altruism and inequity aversion. An important finding of the literature on the topic of group membership is that subjects react to membership in a very subjective manner, disregarding objective considerations. Billing and Tajfel (1973) observe that the even most minimal connections within a group still give rise to in-group positive discrimination. Although subjects realised that the basis of group composition wa s entirely random, they still discriminated toward their fellow members in a very significant way. The fact that the weakest bonds are able to create positive in-group interaction is an important consideration when examining the relation between perceptions of social identity and expressions of social preferences. While group membership is a powerful force, transnational studies have shown that the cooperation inducing group mentality is not a universally consistent attribute. Buchan, Croson and Johnson (1999) find that subjects from the U.S. are more trusting when paired with in-group members but that this is not the case for subjects from China and Japan, who are more trusting in general, regardless of whom they were paired with. Buchan and Croson (1999) also find variations across genders observing that although participants trust men and women equally, women are seen to reciprocate more than men in Trust Games and are more generous in Dictator Games, findings that are consistent internationally. Another consistency that was found across nationalities in this study was the effect that communication between players had on trust and reciprocation levels, a conclusion also mirrored in other experiments. Roth (1995) found that even simple, seemingly irrelevant conversations significantly increa sed the levels of these social preferences. Regardless of variations across nationality, gender and communication levels, it is apparent that there is a clear connection between identity and social preferences. As we categorise individuals into social categories, we not only presume they possess certain qualities and attributes but we also predict how they react. In the same way we use metaperspectives to shape our own actions based on vague notions of the social identities of others, we also use these imperfect images to form inherently imperfect expectations of future interactions. The perception and reality can at times be irreconcilable and yet any initial interaction uses this as its basis. McCall and Simmons (1978) put forward the idea that any interaction that takes place is solely based on images that are constructed in the minds of those interacting. Taking into account the inaccuracy of these constructs when strangers interact, we can see how this translates into the laymans term of prejudice, a concept closely linke d with trust. The concept of trust, as mentioned earlier is based on confidence and at the heart of confidence is a deep reliance on predictions and expectations which are in turn based on the rough identities that we perceive others to possess. This results in great variance in trust levels which, although proven in studies referred to above, is readily seen in everyday life. Trust can be unquestioned with interactions with family members and friends but displayed with lesser and lesser extents to strangers and those who we perceive as untrustworthy. Just as signalling is used in the employment markets, so it is in our trust-dependant interactions. One may ask a well-dressed, polite and friendly stranger to watch over some personal belongings in a library but may be loath to leave anything unattended when in the presence of hooded youth. The hood can be seen as a signal that the wearer is dangerous and cannot be trusted. It is perceived as the expression of an identity, the perception of which ca n influence our attitudes and behaviour. The studies above also show that identity can greatly affect reciprocity, inequity aversion and altruism. Experiments based around group membership, however minimal, show the great influence groups have on these social preferences. One explanation of this is the concept of metaperspectives, in that individuals are more generous in experimental games because they believe that their counterpart expects them to be. Akerlofs (1997:1008) model of social distance also sheds some light on this by theorising that individuals benefit from lesser amounts of social distance between them and thus have the incentive to conform to expectations, what he labels The Conformist Model. A reduction of social distance between players can also be achieved by perceived acts of kindness and so experimental game players may be willing to sacrifice monetary gains so as to achieve social gains with another player. This incentive however, is again based on social distance and those players who feel socially far apart may feel no need to become socially closer, a feeling that is ultimately merely based on their perception of the current social distance and social identities. Two significant ways in which individuals identify themselves and others is by their nationality and gender. At the outset of mankinds evolution, gender has been a universal divider of the human race, preceding all other identities. Rooted in our biology, gender is the simplest form of classification, but its implications are far more wide-reaching than simple physiology. To the opposite sex, gender implies certain generalised roles, attitudes, commitments, experiences and lifestyles. The source of such clear social stereotypes is only in part biological and many academics are of the belief that behavioural and psychological differences are created and perpetuated by unbalanced power and privilege structures in society (Flax 1990). The amplification of social distance is caused by the notion that qualities are gender specific, with masculinity and femininity being attributes in themselves, and the fact that men and women are commonly associated with their relative positions in both f amily life and work life. Lockheed (1985) supposes that women are conceived as compliant followers and men dominant leaders only because of the common minority and majority balance that is common in social and work situations. The large disparity between the social identity and actual realities of members of the opposite sex provides a good opportunity to explore to what extent interaction is based on unqualified perceptions and to map the effect of variations in this perception. Unlike gender identities, nationalism is a relatively new force in the world (Smith 1995). It can be seen as a group identity that has transcended some cultures, as seen in the ethnically diverse nations such as India and Russia, but divided others as seen in the cases of North and South Korea and the Taiwanese and Chinese separation and is manifested in positive discrimination towards fellow nationals and negative discrimination towards foreigners (Macesich, 1985). Breton (1964:378) notes that governments utilise nationalistic instruments†¦ for the purpose of increasing the share of assets in a given assets in a given territory owned by the nationals of that territory. Breton (1964) also observes that nationalistic redistribution of investment and capital results in a lower rate of return than would be realised if resources were allocated efficiently, an observation that draws parallels with the nature of social preferences on a much larger scale. The practice of promoting thes e nationalistic policies that are not beneficial to certain population segments is centred on the formation of a nation-wide group identity that promotes solidarity in the same way that smaller scale groups do. The membership of these nation-groups is defined according to several commonalities. Members share an economy, a historic territory, myths and memories, a public culture, and a set of legal rights (Smith 1991). What is clear from this definition is the lack of consistent personal characteristics, illustrating that members of a nation-group vary considerably in their social and personal identities. The minimal nature of the nation-group is accepted by many academics, some seeing nationalism as an ironic tool that encourages members to appreciate things that are national for the mere fact that it is national (Breton 1964). Karl Deutsch (1969:3) aptly described a nation as a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours, evoking the notion that national identity is a predominately social construct inaccurately perceived to be connected to common characteristics, descent and preferences. (Smith 1996) stresses that the perception of ones own nationality and that of others is inherently only emotional, implying a subjective disregard for objective considerations that results in large social distances between foreigners and nationals, and smaller social distances between nationals. However erroneous, the very substantial influence nationality exerts can be seen through the stereotypical actions of distrusting of foreigners and supporting fellow country-men, making nationality another excellent candidate identity to examine how variations in perceived identity cause variations in the social preferences displayed. Experimental Design and Implementation It is social identity and its inherently variable quality that is at the heart of this study. It is this studys aim to discover in what way the perception of this identity can affect the extent that social preferences are displayed and whether or not a shift of focus from one form of social identity to another will cause a change in degree of social preferences manifested. Given its ability to expose these preferences, an extension of the Trust Game is used Effects of Manipulating Individual Identity Effects of Manipulating Individual Identity Abstract: This study examined how changing the perception of social distance changed the way in which subjects interacted in the Trust Game specifically looking into the social preferences they displayed. A discussion of both economic and sociological research demonstrates the inherent variability of social identity and social distance and the interconnected nature these concepts have with social preferences. A two-stage experiment involving subjects of different nationalities and genders was carried out with a different identity focus in each stage. Findings show that subjects exhibit greater social preferences when interacting with those of a similar focused identity yet the degrees of these preferences displayed vary in accordance to the identity focus. Results suggest that social distance, although easily manipulated, is a powerful force in interactions. The results are consistent with previous studies into group membership, identity, nationality, gender and social preferences. Given this studys far-reaching implications it should be viewed as the premise for future study of this topic. Introduction The concept of social distance as elucidated by Akerlof (1997) is profoundly linked with social identity and social preferences. It is the differences in individuals social identities, including for example, race, gender, class and status, that determine the benefits of interaction and to what extent of social preferences are displayed. Yet when individuals are not entirely familiar with each other, the perception of social identities is based on very few observations and is therefore not entirely accurate. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether or not variations in the perception of social identity, and thus social distance, will affect the extent to which social preferences are manifested. Studies on the effect of identity are in no way new. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) studied its relevance and magnitude with regards to gender discrimination in the workplace, poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of labour. Akerlof (1997) also studied the effect of social distance, asserting that the social identity of individuals can substantially affect their interactions. What has not been tested, however, is to what extent identity is merely a perception. Individuals can and do possess multiple identities varying in dominance from situation to situation. The hypothesis of this paper is that social preferences are relevant in experimental games, but these are dependent on how each player perceives the others social identity, a perception that is inherently variable. Players react with varying degrees of self-interest according to the identity they perceive, even when identical character profiles are involved. Recent economic studies fail to sufficiently incorporate current sociological thinking as to the nature of social identity and although this study will give evidence for the relevance of social distance in determining degrees of social preferences, it will attempt to shed light on individuals inconsistent perception of the distance between them. In order to add weight to this position, an experiment was organised in which participants of various profiles were invited to play the Trust Game. Each game was played face-to-face with no verbal communication. The experiment was divided into two stages, a nationality focused stage and a gender focused stage. Each participant played the game twice and never with the same opposing player. Before each game, participants were assigned to certain rooms in which video clips were played depending on the identity focused on. In the first stage, participants were split into three rooms, one for each nationality present: Scottish, English and Chinese. After one play of the Trust Game, the experiment commenced its second stage and participants were split into two rooms, one for each gender, and again asked to play the game. The results show that there is significant variation in the degrees of social preferences displayed depending on the identity being focused on hereafter referred to as the focused identity. When nationality was the focused identity, those with this common identity exhibited greater social preferences than those of differing nationalities, regardless of gender. When gender was the focused identity, those with this common identity exhibited greater social preferences than those of differing gender, regardless, to some extent, of nationality. This lack of consistency shows that the perception of social distance is not a constant through both stages and yet it is still proves to be a determining factor in how players interact. The following content of this paper is arranged into four sections. Section 2 will address the relevant literature with regards to social preferences and identity, showing their relevance, interconnected nature and inherent variability, discussing the application of various theories in the context of this study. Section 3 will describe the design and implementation of the experiment used in this study with the results, analysis and comparisons to similar studies presented in Section 4. An interpretation of these results and further conclusions will be offered in Section 5. Theories of Preferences and Identity To clearly understand the argument presented, a holistic discussion of current theories must be embarked upon. The relevance of social preferences and the forms of their analysis through experimental games will be examined in this section to create the context in which this study is placed. The concepts of identity and how they shape perceptions and interactions will then be considered before discussing their relationship with social preferences. Social Preferences The assumption that man is motivated by self-interest is one that has dominated economic theory and is indeed fundamental to the very ideology of the vast majority of economists. As Adam Smith (1910:13) suggests, It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. Inherent in this analogy is the implication that self-interest is the primary motivator in our economic interactions, and it is through this impulse that equilibria are formed. In Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium is obtained by each player assuming the other possesses purely selfish motives. This assumption, however, is not always consistent with reality. Many factors influence an individuals decisions and it is evident that the maximisation of material gain is not always a dominating motivation. Some of the factors influencing an individuals decisions can relate to social status, group membership, inequity aversion, reciprocity, s pite, envy, altruism and identity. These factors form a preference set, referred to in this study as social preferences. Although the theory of self-interest has been ingrained in traditional economics, modern economists have increasingly questioned this supposition. In fact the traditional authors of this theory were also wary of its realism. Even though Edgeworth (1881:16) writes that the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest, he concedes that Man is, in reality, for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian, (Edgeworth 1881:104). It is evident that we are influenced by unselfish motives in our interactions with others and it follows that these interactions will in many circumstances involve material profit and loss. This is the realm of social preferences. Amartya Sen (1977:336), in his seminal paper on the irrationality of traditional preference theory states that the purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. He argues that theories that do not encompass the influence of sympathy and our commitment to it are incomplete. It is the result of this basic emotion that our social norms, laws and codes of conduct are formed and without which no society would be feasible (Johansen 1977). In various studies into social preferences, it is seen that they are comprised of multiple aspects. Reciprocity, inequity aversion, altruism and trust are all basic components of this preference set (Andreoni et al. 2002). When kindness or animosity is shown, the impulse exists to reciprocate in like manner. When inequity exists, the urge exists to rebel against it. Altruism is the virtue that depends on no form of expected gain or reciprocity, the purest form of good will. Trust is the confidence in the future actions of another and is arguably the most variable of the social preferences and one that will be revisited in this study. Each of these attributes are far from abstract philosophical concepts, exert great influence on our economic interactions. Agell and Lundberg (1995) discovered that as a result of workers being influenced by fairness and equity customs, wage cuts were often unprofitable, with workers objecting to an unfair action. This can have a direct impact on the extent that a company vertically integrates, with out-sourcing often being far more viable given the reciprocal attitude of workers. Bewley (1999) also noted that a firms policy can affect worker morale and as such companies must take into account the perceived fairness of their policies. The extent of tax evasion has also been correlated to how fair it is perceived, and in fact the entire structure of tax systems are thoroughly debated and altered according to the principles of equity and merit (Seidl and Traub 2002). The perception of unreciprocated generosity has been one of the causes of the general reduction in support from the US w elfare state. People are disinclined to support welfare structures that give the impression that they are helping a poor segment of society that refuse to help themselves, content to live off the goodwill of others (Bowles and Gintis 2000). Fukuyama (1995) also correlates economic prosperity with higher levels of trust, suggesting that social preferences are a very powerful force even in the current global economic system. Sequential games Although the examples given are wide-ranging in scope, involving relatively large economic issues, social preferences have also been proven to have a significant effect on individual interactions. Previously experimental games have been used to prove the dominating forces of self-interest, the equilibria of these experiments being calculated by assuming that all agents were exclusively self-interested (Fehr and Schmict, 2001). Recently, economists have carried out several experiments involving non-cooperative games that contradict this presumption. Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) were among the first to create a game that did just this. It is called the Ultimatum Game. There are two players in the game, one a Proposer and one a Responder. The Proposer must divide an amount of money X between the two players, offering the Responder any amount Y = X. If Responder accepts, the Proposer receives the remaining money X – Y, if they reject, both receive nothing. Under self-interested preferences, the efficient equilibrium is the one in which the Proposer gives the least amount possible to the Responder, who will accept any amount. In reality however, offers of less than a fifth of X are rejected about half time and Proposers anticipating this generally offer around 30 to 50 percent of X (Hoffman et al. 1996). This result clearly shows that factors other than self-interest are at play. It would be reasonable to assume that altruism and reciprocity both play a part in the decision-making process of both players. The Proposer may be influenced by a code of morals and a concept of fairness to offer more than the standard equilibrium distribution. The P roposer must also take into account the Responders sense of reciprocity and animosity towards a seemingly unfair distribution. Although the Responder is under no monetary incentive to reject a low offer, yet his social preferences mean that he is able to achieve some utility by spiting the Proposer, thereby valuing a certain amount of reciprocity over monetary value. Given the fact that the Proposers actions may be driven only by the fear of reciprocity and no sense of altruism, it is worthwhile to look into the Dictators Game first introduced by Kahneman et al. (1986) and refined by Forsythe et al. (1994). In this game, the Responder, now called the Recipient, is not given the option to accept or refuse the amount given by the Proposer. If the Proposer is motivated by self-interested alone, they will offer nothing to the Recipient but as many experiments have shown, this is not always the case. Henrich et al. (2001) find that in most dictator game experiments there is a primary mode offer of zero percent of the Proposers total wealth and a secondary mode offer of 50 percent. Some groups show a primary mode offer of 20 percent and a secondary mode of 50 percent providing strong evidence of inequity aversion. In addition to supporting the notion that man is not exclusively self-interested, studies also confirm that fear of reciprocity is present i n the Ultimatum Game and that Proposers apply backwards induction with average offers being lower in the Dictator Game (Roth et al. 1991). The Trust Game, developed by Berg et al. (1995) is a game that can be used to test the presence of altruism, inequity aversion, reciprocity and its namesake, trust. The game is played with an Investor and a Trustee, with the former being given an initial endowment of X and the latter given nothing. The Investor is then able to give any amount Y between 0 and X. The amount the Trustee receives will be tripled, amounting to 3Y. The Trustee is then given the option to give any amount Z between 0 and 3Y back to the Investor thereby making the payoffs of the Investor and the Trustee X – Y + Z and 3Y – Z respectively. The Trustee is under no monetary incentive to return any amount and as such, under strictly self-interested preferences the Investor will predict this and give the Trustee nothing but, as with the Ultimatum and Dictator Games, studies show that many players of the Trust Game deviate from this equilibrium. Berg et al. (1995) find that almost all Investors give so me amount of money to the Trustee and that a substantial number of Trustees return at least the same amount and that a third even returned more than they received. The amount returned also increases with the amount given thus supporting the theory that reciprocity is an integral part of many preference sets. Investors and Trustees are able to display inequity aversion by choosing to give or return amounts that will equalise final payoffs. Trustees can also display altruism by returning anything over and above the amount needed to equalise payoffs. It is interesting to note that there is substantial variation in the amounts given, with no clear average amount entrusted. The variation is not unsurprising, however, given the inherent inconsistency in levels of trust that individuals demonstrate in their interactions with various individuals. In society, trust placed in an individual is dependent on who that individual is or, in other terms, trust placed is dependent on the perceived id entity of the individual in question. Identity Identity, at its most fundamental level, is at the base of all human interaction. For an individual to interact with another, the individual must have a clear concept of both himself and of the other. It is in the consideration of these two concepts that decisions are made. Descartes (1912:167) famously stated †¦I think, therefore I am, and in doing so sparked off the philosophical debate on what truly directs our thoughts and actions. Hume (1888) further develops this by exploring our perception of ourselves, our identity. It was his belief that we can only perceive ourselves, and build our identity, by categorisation in the light of selected characteristics and never perceive our true reality in objective terms. It is out-with the bounds of this study to discuss in depth the sociological and psychological complexities of this topic, yet it is worth-while bringing to light some key concepts to further the understanding of the interactions between this studys participants. An identity is a tool of recognition. It allows us to recognise individuals, categories, groups and types of individuals, Wiley (1994:130). More than this, it is also a tool of categorisation and emotional cues. It implies a conscious awareness by members of a group, some positive or negative emotional feelings towards the characteristics which members of a group perceive themselves as sharing and in which they perceive themselves as differing from others, Mennell (1994:177). Goffman (1968) further expounds these aspects of recognition by dividing identity into three sections: the personal identity, the ego identity and the social identity. The personal identity is the unique identification that each individual possesses to differentiate themselves technically, legally and realistically from all others. The ego identity is a purely subjective observation that is built from a multitude of social experiences and is a sense of ones own particular state and nature. The social identity pr ovides a way of categorising people and connects each person with a set of attributes and characteristics thought to be in keeping with the members of their respective categories. Individuals that possess commonalities in the form of thought, action, nature, experience or lifestyle can all be grouped into various social identities. Examples of social identities are nationality, gender, music-taste, age, profession and political views. It is important to stress that while individuals may only hold one personal and ego identity, they are able to juggle multiple social identities which have varying degrees of focus from situation to situation. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) put forward the theorem that our perception of our ego identity can have a significant influence on our decisions and actions. Their theorem sheds light on a number of seemingly irrational choices. Actions that are of apparent detriment to an individual can be viewed as a form of behaviour that it used to create a more unique self identity. Similarly, steps may be taken to symbolise the assumption of a particular identity or the membership of a certain group, be they conscious or otherwise. Men do not generally wear dresses, and as such this behavioural code is unconsciously subscribed to by the majority of men. Any behaviour to the contrary poses a challenge not merely to the social norm, but to the identity of manhood itself. Attempts to manipulate an individuals decisions can be based on the notion of identity. In order to influence people to buy their products, companies create advertisements that often show a stylised form of a particular identity that people may aspire to. Finally, as identity can play such a large role in determining our economic decisions and behaviour, and assuming that individuals can choose their own identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) conclude that identity choices can be a major factor in a persons overall economic well-being, a conclusion strengthened by the theory of role-identities. It is difficult to determine to what extent our identity is prescriptive or descriptive in relation to our own actions, but nevertheless the dual concepts of identity and role are deeply interconnected. Lyman and Scott (1970:136) clarify this link by stating that roles are identities mobilised in a specific situation; whereas role is always situationally specific, identities are trans-situational. By assuming an identity, we also assume a role. Despite that the fact that this role varies from situation to situation, it is at all times consistent with the assumed identity. It is from this notion that expectations and metaperspectives are formed. Laing et al. (1966) pioneered the belief that it is not I but you that is important. More specifically they claimed that we are all deeply influenced by considering our view of others view of ourselves and in such a way develop a role-performance that conforms to the expectation others have of our behaviour so as to receive positive feedback o r avoid negative feedback. In order to assess these expectations and act accordingly, we must first judge what these expectations are. With strangers, this is problematic, and as such we orient ourselves toward them in terms only of the ill-specified contours of their social roles, (McCall and Simmons, 1978:70). In this respect, we are only able to form rough estimations of a persons true identity and thereby rely on our perception of how they fit into vague boundaries of social identities. When we perceive people this way, our perception of the attributes they possess as ascribed by their social identity is often completely arbitrary when viewed in the context of an objective character analysis. The perception and reality can at times be poles apart, decreasing in accuracy with increasing social distance. Identities and Social Preferences Akerlof (1997) defined social distance as a measure of social proximity between individuals. The model he created summarises that people gain benefits from interacting to those socially closer to themselves, with these benefits decreasing with isolation. This model is supported by empirical evidence that suggests that trust and reciprocity are linked with social connection and that members of the same nationality and race exhibit greater degrees of these attributes towards one another (Glaeser et al. 1999). A common method of analysing social distance is through the construction of groups in experiments and many studies of this kind have provided quite significant results. Studying the effects of group membership on cooperation, Orbell et al. (1988) find that subjects are far more likely to cooperate with in-group members than out-group members, with 79% of participants showing cooperation with the former and only 30% showing cooperation with the latter. Through using a variation on the dictator game, Frey and Bohnet (1997) also showed how group membership affects social preferences. The experiment observed that in-group members were allocated far more of the total endowment than out-group members suggesting some correlation with membership and altruism and inequity aversion. An important finding of the literature on the topic of group membership is that subjects react to membership in a very subjective manner, disregarding objective considerations. Billing and Tajfel (1973) observe that the even most minimal connections within a group still give rise to in-group positive discrimination. Although subjects realised that the basis of group composition wa s entirely random, they still discriminated toward their fellow members in a very significant way. The fact that the weakest bonds are able to create positive in-group interaction is an important consideration when examining the relation between perceptions of social identity and expressions of social preferences. While group membership is a powerful force, transnational studies have shown that the cooperation inducing group mentality is not a universally consistent attribute. Buchan, Croson and Johnson (1999) find that subjects from the U.S. are more trusting when paired with in-group members but that this is not the case for subjects from China and Japan, who are more trusting in general, regardless of whom they were paired with. Buchan and Croson (1999) also find variations across genders observing that although participants trust men and women equally, women are seen to reciprocate more than men in Trust Games and are more generous in Dictator Games, findings that are consistent internationally. Another consistency that was found across nationalities in this study was the effect that communication between players had on trust and reciprocation levels, a conclusion also mirrored in other experiments. Roth (1995) found that even simple, seemingly irrelevant conversations significantly increa sed the levels of these social preferences. Regardless of variations across nationality, gender and communication levels, it is apparent that there is a clear connection between identity and social preferences. As we categorise individuals into social categories, we not only presume they possess certain qualities and attributes but we also predict how they react. In the same way we use metaperspectives to shape our own actions based on vague notions of the social identities of others, we also use these imperfect images to form inherently imperfect expectations of future interactions. The perception and reality can at times be irreconcilable and yet any initial interaction uses this as its basis. McCall and Simmons (1978) put forward the idea that any interaction that takes place is solely based on images that are constructed in the minds of those interacting. Taking into account the inaccuracy of these constructs when strangers interact, we can see how this translates into the laymans term of prejudice, a concept closely linke d with trust. The concept of trust, as mentioned earlier is based on confidence and at the heart of confidence is a deep reliance on predictions and expectations which are in turn based on the rough identities that we perceive others to possess. This results in great variance in trust levels which, although proven in studies referred to above, is readily seen in everyday life. Trust can be unquestioned with interactions with family members and friends but displayed with lesser and lesser extents to strangers and those who we perceive as untrustworthy. Just as signalling is used in the employment markets, so it is in our trust-dependant interactions. One may ask a well-dressed, polite and friendly stranger to watch over some personal belongings in a library but may be loath to leave anything unattended when in the presence of hooded youth. The hood can be seen as a signal that the wearer is dangerous and cannot be trusted. It is perceived as the expression of an identity, the perception of which ca n influence our attitudes and behaviour. The studies above also show that identity can greatly affect reciprocity, inequity aversion and altruism. Experiments based around group membership, however minimal, show the great influence groups have on these social preferences. One explanation of this is the concept of metaperspectives, in that individuals are more generous in experimental games because they believe that their counterpart expects them to be. Akerlofs (1997:1008) model of social distance also sheds some light on this by theorising that individuals benefit from lesser amounts of social distance between them and thus have the incentive to conform to expectations, what he labels The Conformist Model. A reduction of social distance between players can also be achieved by perceived acts of kindness and so experimental game players may be willing to sacrifice monetary gains so as to achieve social gains with another player. This incentive however, is again based on social distance and those players who feel socially far apart may feel no need to become socially closer, a feeling that is ultimately merely based on their perception of the current social distance and social identities. Two significant ways in which individuals identify themselves and others is by their nationality and gender. At the outset of mankinds evolution, gender has been a universal divider of the human race, preceding all other identities. Rooted in our biology, gender is the simplest form of classification, but its implications are far more wide-reaching than simple physiology. To the opposite sex, gender implies certain generalised roles, attitudes, commitments, experiences and lifestyles. The source of such clear social stereotypes is only in part biological and many academics are of the belief that behavioural and psychological differences are created and perpetuated by unbalanced power and privilege structures in society (Flax 1990). The amplification of social distance is caused by the notion that qualities are gender specific, with masculinity and femininity being attributes in themselves, and the fact that men and women are commonly associated with their relative positions in both f amily life and work life. Lockheed (1985) supposes that women are conceived as compliant followers and men dominant leaders only because of the common minority and majority balance that is common in social and work situations. The large disparity between the social identity and actual realities of members of the opposite sex provides a good opportunity to explore to what extent interaction is based on unqualified perceptions and to map the effect of variations in this perception. Unlike gender identities, nationalism is a relatively new force in the world (Smith 1995). It can be seen as a group identity that has transcended some cultures, as seen in the ethnically diverse nations such as India and Russia, but divided others as seen in the cases of North and South Korea and the Taiwanese and Chinese separation and is manifested in positive discrimination towards fellow nationals and negative discrimination towards foreigners (Macesich, 1985). Breton (1964:378) notes that governments utilise nationalistic instruments†¦ for the purpose of increasing the share of assets in a given assets in a given territory owned by the nationals of that territory. Breton (1964) also observes that nationalistic redistribution of investment and capital results in a lower rate of return than would be realised if resources were allocated efficiently, an observation that draws parallels with the nature of social preferences on a much larger scale. The practice of promoting thes e nationalistic policies that are not beneficial to certain population segments is centred on the formation of a nation-wide group identity that promotes solidarity in the same way that smaller scale groups do. The membership of these nation-groups is defined according to several commonalities. Members share an economy, a historic territory, myths and memories, a public culture, and a set of legal rights (Smith 1991). What is clear from this definition is the lack of consistent personal characteristics, illustrating that members of a nation-group vary considerably in their social and personal identities. The minimal nature of the nation-group is accepted by many academics, some seeing nationalism as an ironic tool that encourages members to appreciate things that are national for the mere fact that it is national (Breton 1964). Karl Deutsch (1969:3) aptly described a nation as a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours, evoking the notion that national identity is a predominately social construct inaccurately perceived to be connected to common characteristics, descent and preferences. (Smith 1996) stresses that the perception of ones own nationality and that of others is inherently only emotional, implying a subjective disregard for objective considerations that results in large social distances between foreigners and nationals, and smaller social distances between nationals. However erroneous, the very substantial influence nationality exerts can be seen through the stereotypical actions of distrusting of foreigners and supporting fellow country-men, making nationality another excellent candidate identity to examine how variations in perceived identity cause variations in the social preferences displayed. Experimental Design and Implementation It is social identity and its inherently variable quality that is at the heart of this study. It is this studys aim to discover in what way the perception of this identity can affect the extent that social preferences are displayed and whether or not a shift of focus from one form of social identity to another will cause a change in degree of social preferences manifested. Given its ability to expose these preferences, an extension of the Trust Game is used

Comparing Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians :: Jefferson Hamilton American Constitution Essays

Comparing Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians The Washington administration was the first to bring together in the cabinet of the United States, the Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and the Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Jefferson and Hamilton began to take different views when the government began to address the issue of the old war debts and the worthless paper money left over from the days of the Confederation. Hamilton suggested that the government should create the Bank of the United States, which would be a public-private partnership with both government and private investors. The Bank of the United States was to handle the government’s banking needs. Jefferson protested because this was not allowed by the Constitution. Hamilton opposed the view of Jefferson and stated that the Constitution’s writers could not have predicted the need of a bank for the United States. Hamilton said that the right to create the Bank of the United States was stated in the â€Å"elastic† or the â€Å"necessary and proper† clause in which the Constitution gave the government the power to pass laws that were necessary for the welfare of the nation. â€Å" This began the argument between the â€Å"strict constructionists† (Jefferson) who believed in the strict interpretation of the Constitution by not going an inch beyond its clearly expressed provisions, and the â€Å"loose constructionists† (Hamilton) who wished to reason out all sorts of implications from what it said†. Hamilton and Jefferson began to disagree more and more. Hamilton wrote nasty anonymous articles in John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States and Jefferson responded to him in Philip Freneau’s National Gazette. Jefferson’s Notes of the State of Virginia in 1787 stated that rural life was beneficial to the government because cities and other areas of large population created poverty, disease, and corruption. Jefferson believed that the small farmers where the backbone of the United States. While in the Report on Manufactures of 1791,Hamilton stated that the government should be used to develop cities, industries, and trade Hamilton believed that â€Å"government's function is to maintain order in a potentially chaotic society. It needs to be remote and secure from the people's emotional uprisings†.Jefferson believed the government â€Å"needs to be limited in its powers and completely responsive to the needs and desires of the people†.Hamilton was strongest among merchants in the cities and throughout New England while Jefferson was strongest among artisans in the cities and throughout the South. Comparing Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians :: Jefferson Hamilton American Constitution Essays Comparing Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians The Washington administration was the first to bring together in the cabinet of the United States, the Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and the Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Jefferson and Hamilton began to take different views when the government began to address the issue of the old war debts and the worthless paper money left over from the days of the Confederation. Hamilton suggested that the government should create the Bank of the United States, which would be a public-private partnership with both government and private investors. The Bank of the United States was to handle the government’s banking needs. Jefferson protested because this was not allowed by the Constitution. Hamilton opposed the view of Jefferson and stated that the Constitution’s writers could not have predicted the need of a bank for the United States. Hamilton said that the right to create the Bank of the United States was stated in the â€Å"elastic† or the â€Å"necessary and proper† clause in which the Constitution gave the government the power to pass laws that were necessary for the welfare of the nation. â€Å" This began the argument between the â€Å"strict constructionists† (Jefferson) who believed in the strict interpretation of the Constitution by not going an inch beyond its clearly expressed provisions, and the â€Å"loose constructionists† (Hamilton) who wished to reason out all sorts of implications from what it said†. Hamilton and Jefferson began to disagree more and more. Hamilton wrote nasty anonymous articles in John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States and Jefferson responded to him in Philip Freneau’s National Gazette. Jefferson’s Notes of the State of Virginia in 1787 stated that rural life was beneficial to the government because cities and other areas of large population created poverty, disease, and corruption. Jefferson believed that the small farmers where the backbone of the United States. While in the Report on Manufactures of 1791,Hamilton stated that the government should be used to develop cities, industries, and trade Hamilton believed that â€Å"government's function is to maintain order in a potentially chaotic society. It needs to be remote and secure from the people's emotional uprisings†.Jefferson believed the government â€Å"needs to be limited in its powers and completely responsive to the needs and desires of the people†.Hamilton was strongest among merchants in the cities and throughout New England while Jefferson was strongest among artisans in the cities and throughout the South.

Comparing Symbolism in Poe :: essays research papers

Comparing the Symbolism of the Houses in the Red Death and House of Usher   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Most stories have occurrences of symbolism. Symbols are used everyday in many different ways. For instance, the Bald Eagle is used to symbolize the determination and nobility of our United States of America. In both the Masque of the Red Death and the Fall of the House of Usher, the symbolic nature of the House plays an imperative role.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The House in the Red Death was a very elaborate and colorful establishment. Each room inside of this enormous house is decorated in a different hue. The easternmost room is decorated in blue, with blue stained-glass windows. The next room is purple with the same color stained-glass windows, then green, then orange, then white, then violet. The seventh room is black, with red windows. Accompanying this last room is a giant wooden clock. Every hour on the hour the clock emits a deafening gong, which puts an immediate halt to any ongoing activities. The fact that the rooms go from east to west is supposed to symbolize life on earth. The sun rises in the east, sets in the west. Our life cycle also follows that pattern. If you look at a typical twenty-four hour day, the day is â€Å"born† in the east and â€Å"dies† in the west. Along with the rooms following an east to west pattern, the color schemes in the rooms also follow this pattern. The first rooms go from blue, which represents the beginning of the day, or life, to purple, green, orange and finally the white room represents noontime. Next comes violet followed by the last room, which is black with red windows symbolizing the end of the day, or the end of life. The whole purpose of these rooms being decorated in the first place is due to the fact that Prince Prospero has decided to throw a ball for all the rich people in the nearby village, which is being plagued by a fatal disease known as the Red Death. All the rich folk run away to the mansion in hopes of eluding the Red Death. In the meantime at the ball, everyone is having a great time. It seems as though they are almost disregarding the fact that there is a plague going on. They almost have the mentality that as long as they hide out in the mansion, they will be immune to the Red Death.

Smoking Cigarettes :: Argumentative Persuasive Example Essays

In 1990, 72 million bottles of a popular mineral water were voluntarily recalled because of small traces of benzene. The smoke from one pack of unfiltered cigarettes has as much benzene as 169 bottles of the contaminated water. Main points What’s in a cigarette? What’s are the effects What’s a smoking addiction What’s in a cigarette? In a cigarette there are many bad substances. Some of them that are listed behind me are: Carbon monoxide, Nitrogen oxides Hydrogen cyanide, Ammonia, Nicotine, Tar, and many other toxic irritants. Tobacco smoke is a mixture of gases and small particles made up of water, tar and nicotine. The tar is a mixture of hundreds of toxic chemicals, many of which are known to cause cancer. The high temperature from the burning end of a cigarette is like a miniature chemical factory. It puts out many more chemicals than are found in tobacco that has not been lit. Altogether more than 4,000 chemical compounds have been identified in tobacco smoke. The chemicals that cause cancer are mainly in the tar. Tar, together with some of the irritant gases, may also be partly responsible for chronic bronchitis and emphysema. Nitrogen oxides are suspected, but the main agents responsible are not yet known. Neither nicotine nor carbon monoxide causes cancer, but they probably work together as causes of the heart diseases associated with smoking. What is an addiction? A smoking addiction means a person has formed an uncontrollable dependence on cigarettes to the point where stopping smoking would cause severe emotional, mental, or physical reactions. Everyone knows that smoking is harmful and addictive, but only a few people realize just how dangerous it can be and how addictive it is. Chances are that about one in three smokers who do not stop will eventually die because of their smoking. On average, they will die 10 to 15 years earlier than they would have died from other causes. Most smokers’ want to stop and do try, but only one in three people try to stop permanently before age 60. By this time there body has been deteriorating. The reason why so many people fail to stop is because they are addicted. Nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction. It is absorbed and enters the bloodstream, through the lungs when smoke is inhaled, and through the lining of the mouth. Nicotine is drug that affects the activity of the brain. It als o has a relaxing effect, especially at times of stress.

Ernest Hemingway: a Farewell to Arms Essay

Is war ever justified? War has been a part of our society since the beginning of time. A Farewell to Arms by Ernest Hemingway is a novel that deals with the justification and commitment to World War I. Frederic Henry, an American ambulance driver for the Italians, struggled to find the answer and ended up loosing his commitment to the war because of words and advice from the priest and his love for Catherine Barkley. He ended up running away from the war to be with his pregnant lover Catherine. Henry’s commitment to the war isn’t genuine. As Henry and the priest discussed who was winning the war at the moment and other subjects, they stated, â€Å"And the ones who would not make war? Can they stop it? † â€Å"I do not know. † â€Å"Have they ever been able to stop it? † â€Å"They are not organized to stop things and when they get organized their leaders sell them out. † â€Å"Then it’s hopeless† (Hemingway p71). In this dialogue, Henry feels as if there is nothing anyone can do to end the war. He feels as if he is stuck in it until he finally dies. He feels that it’s hopeless to carry on anymore if there is no sign of halting. This type of attitude shows he is not committed to the war. While Henry was talking to the priest, he stated, â€Å"They were beaten to start with†¦ put him in power and see how wise he is. † (Hemingway p179). Henry thinks that the people that are fighting with him have already lost from the start because it wasn’t their decision to fight. He’s suggesting that the peasants aren’t fighting their hardest. They were forced off there farms and expected to fight. Henry thinks because they have already been defeated that there is no way they are going to win the war. His attitude again shows that he is not committed or hopeful about the war. Later on when Henry is still talking to the priest they say, â€Å"I hoped for a long time for victory. † â€Å"Me too. † â€Å"Now I don’t know. † â€Å"It has to be one or the other. † â€Å"I don’t believe in victory any more. † â€Å"I don’t. But I don’t believe in defeat. Though it may be better. † (Hemingway p179). Henry is saying that he doesn’t believe in Victory or defeat, but defeat may be better. Henry believes that the only way out of this war is through defeat. The Germans will never give in so the only way for the war to end is through the Italians loosing. He is tired of this war and doesn’t care who wins anymore. If Henry was committed to this war, then he would stay with it until victory is ahead. Henry’s commitment to World War I is not genuine. He doesn’t feel like the war is going anywhere and is aggravated that no one has given in. He doesn’t care anymore who wins the war as long as it’s over. He is no longer committed and just wants to leave. Henry’s commitment was never genuine.

PUMA Marketing Essay

Executive Summary The multi-billion global sportswear industry is a highly competitive sector that is continually evolving. Two of the largest players in this industry are Nike Co., which holds 37% market share, and PUMA with 7% market share. Objectives To support its growth target to $23 billion by 2011, Nike intends to expand its market penetration in India, China, Brazil, and other emerging economies. To achieve this end, the company plans to create brands that are tailored-fit to different markets. PUMA , on the other hand, targets regional and product type expansion. The company has drafted a five year plan to reach this goal. Positioning/Product/Service/Price Strategy Analysis These leading manufacturers have differing approaches in their marketing strategies. Nike has poised itself as an innovator of high quality sportswear, making sports as part of an active lifestyle. It invests heavily in advertising and marketing campaigns to create brand power and awareness. The Nike name is associated wit h quality, success, and greatness. As a result of its successful marketing strategies, Nike has become part of sports culture. Its products are categorized under basketball, soccer, women’s, running, men’s, sports culture, and others. For the year ended December 31, 2007, Nike reported revenues of $16 billion, where more than half of which came from its athletic footwear division. On the other hand, Puma has positioned itself as a manufacturer that combines functionality with style, creating a niche among the fashion-conscious sports enthusiasts. It cooperates with designers from strategic markets, like Japan, to come up with designs that meet the company’s goal of providing stylish sportswear that appeal to the high-end market. Its business is segmented into footwear, apparel and accessories. For the fiscal year 2007, PUMA reported revenues of $2.4 billion, where sixty percent of which was earned from footwear. Market Analysis Both Nike and PUMA target eighteen to thirty-five year old males and females globally. Despite the similarity of its market, the two companies attract different sorts of consumers. Nike has a strong consumer base for its performance shoes, while PUMA’s strength lies on its cas ual shoes. Distribution Strategy Analysis Distribution reach is a key factor for the success of Nike and PUMA. Nike is headquartered in Oregon, and distributes its products in about twenty-two thousand locations with eleven central distribution centers. This extensive reach allows Nike to be available to the most number of people around the world. Puma is based in Herzogenaurach, Germany, with distribution channels in more than eighty countries worldwide. However, it is largely concentrated in the European region, resulting to a lower market share. Both companies do not sell directly to the public. Instead, they sell through retail stores located in malls or department stores. Promotion Strategies Analysis PUMA’s five-year plan for 2006-2010 focuses on expansion of: †¢ product segments, †¢ regional penetration and †¢ non-PUMA brands. To do this, the company is shifting focus to capture younger consumers without losing its high-end costumers. It is also negotiating for the transfer of company control to PPR, a conglomerate that operates luxury brands like Gucci and YSL. This move is seen to increase sales for PUMA’s sneakers and up profits by at least ten percent. For Nike, it continues its innovations coupled with aggressive marketing campaigns to promote its products and hold on to its leading position in the market. Conclusion Nike will continue to be the sportswear industry leader for the years to come. The company’s approach to innovation and its highly aggressive marketing campaigns will ensure the company its top position in the market. As it continue to provide quality products that appeal to majority of the target consumers, Nike will be able to reach its goal of posting a fifty percent revenue increase by 2011. Puma’s shift in focus will help the company achieve a bigger market share. By reinventing its product lines and expanding its reach particularly in the U.S. market, PUMA will be able to increase its share target. The German company also needs to create products that would cater to the middle-end consumers. From this project, I have learned that marketing strategies and promotional campaigns do a lot to the brand. As a result of brand power, a company’s pricing will also be at an advantage. I have also learned that Nike’s management is doing very well to keep the company at the forefront, compared to PUMA’s top executives who are still in the process of making the company more competitive globally.